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Cybersurveillance in a Free Society
Russell L. Weaver*
When Edward Snowden stole and released thousands of
National Security Agency (NSA) documents,1 he exposed a massive
secret governmental cybersurveillance operation.2 Although U.S.
citizens might have anticipated that the U.S. government was
collecting information about terrorists and criminals, few could
have imagined the all-encompassing nature of the NSA
surveillance program.3 With a budget of $10.8 billion per year4 and
35,000 employees,5 the NSA was systematically collecting data
about virtually everyone and everything, amassing millions of cell
phone call records, e-mails, text messages, credit-card-purchase
records, and information from social media networks.6 In addition,
* Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of
Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
1. See Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming N.S.A.:
From Spying on Leader of U.N. to Tracking Drug Deals, an Ethos of ‘Why Not?’,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2013, at A1, A10 (“Since Edward J. Snowden began releasing
the agency’s documents in June, the unrelenting stream of disclosures has opened
the most extended debate on the agency’s mission since its creation in 1952.”);
Doug Stanglin, Snowden Says NSA Can Tap Email Chats, COURIER-J., Aug. 1,
2013, at A3 (“Documents provided by National Security Agency leaker Edward
Snowden detail a top-secret program that purportedly allows analysts to search
without prior authorization, large databases of emails, online chats and people’s
individual browsing histories, The Guardian reports.”).
2. See Shane, supra note 1, at A10 (“A review of classified agency
documents obtained by Mr. Snowden and shared with The New York Times by
The Guardian, offers a rich sampling of the agency’s global operations and
culture.”).
3. See id. at A10 (describing the shock and outrage of the American public
at the sheer magnitude of bulk data collection).
4. Id. at A1.
5. Id.
6. See id. at A1, A10 (describing the NSA’s bulk data collection); see also
Peter Maass, How Laura Poitras Helped Snowden Spill His Secrets, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Aug. 13, 2013, at MM22 (describing Snowden’s disclosures to
documentarian Laura Poitras); Charlie Savage, C.I.A. Ties to AT&T Add Another
Side to Spy Debate, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 8, 2013, at A5 (“The C.I.A. is paying
AT&T more than $10 million a year to assist with overseas counterterrorism
investigations by exploiting the company’s vast database of phone records, which
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the NSA created a system that enabled it to easily access Yahoo
and Google accounts.7 The end result was that the NSA intercepted
some 182 million communication records, including “to” and “from”
e-mail information, as well as text, audio, and video information.8
The cybersurveillance program was shrouded in secrecy in
that U.S. governmental officials were neither open nor truthful
regarding the size and scope of the NSA program. For example,
President Obama assured the U.S. public that the NSA was not
targeting ordinary U.S. citizens, but rather was focused only on
communications from individuals who posed a terrorist threat to
the United States (for example, communications of “foreign
intelligence value”9 and foreign intelligence targets).10 The
President also boldly proclaimed, “Nobody is listening to your
telephone calls.”11 Likewise, the NSA declared that it was not
storing private online or phone information except under limited
circumstances: when it believed that the recording or transcript
contained “foreign intelligence information,” evidence of a possible
crime, a “threat of serious harm to life or property,” or could shed
“light on technical issues like encryption or vulnerability to cyber
attacks.”12 However, it soon became clear that the NSA had
established a huge data storage center (taking advantage of the
includes Americans' international calls.”).
7. See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Hacks Yahoo, Google:
Global Data Links Expose Untold Millions of Accounts, COURIER-J., Oct. 31, 2013,
at A1 (describing a project called MUSCULAR that the NSA used to secretly
break into Yahoo and Google data centers around the world).
8. See Martha Mendoza, Reagan’s Order Led to NSA’s Broader Spying,
COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 24, 2013, at A19, c.1–6 (“With the cooperation of foreign
allies, the NSA is potentially gaining access to every email sent or received abroad
from Google and Yahoo’s email services, as well as anything in GoogleDocs, Maps
or Voice, according to a series of articles in the Washington Post.”).
9. See Scott Shane, Documents Detail Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2014, at A9 (“N.S.A. officers who intercept an American online or on the phone—
say, while monitoring the phone or e-mail of a foreign diplomat or a suspected
terrorist—can preserve the recording or transcript if they believe the contents
include ‘foreign intelligence information’ or evidence of a possible crime.”); see also
Mendoza, supra note 8, at A19, c.1 (“‘What NSA does is collect the
communications of targets of feign intelligence value, irrespective of the provider
that carries them,’ the agency said, likening the data channels at private firms to
superhighways.”).
10. See generally Shane, supra note 9.
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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declining cost of data storage and advances in search software)13
and was routinely collecting extraordinarily large amounts of
information regarding virtually everyone.14 As a result, even if
Americans were not the intended targets of NSA eavesdropping,
they routinely fell “into the agency’s global net.”15
The NSA surveillance program raises fundamental questions
regarding the relationship between the U.S. government and the
U.S. citizenry. Undoubtedly, government has a legitimate interest
in investigating and collecting information regarding suspected
terrorists. Government also has a legitimate interest in shielding
certain types of information (for example, state secrets or vital
information that is potentially damaging to national security or
foreign relations) from public disclosure.16 However, the question
is one of balance. In a democratic society, legitimate questions
might be raised regarding whether the government should be
involved in such broad-based surveillance, and whether it should
be conducting such operations in secret without democratic
accountability.
I. The Founding Generation’s Skepticism of Government:
“Separation of Powers” and “Checks and Balances”
The NSA cybersurveillance program raises a host of troubling
issues for U.S. citizens. Although the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution embraced (to a greater or lesser extent) democratic
principles, they remained highly distrustful of a powerful
government—even a democratically elected one.17 Illustrative
13. See Scott Shane & David E. Sanger, Job Title Key to Inner Access Held
by Leaker, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A1 (“That is evidently what gave birth to
a vast data storage center that the N.S.A. is building in Utah, exploiting the
declining cost of storage and the advance of sophisticated search software.”).
14. See generally Shane, supra note 9.
15. Id.
16. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (ordering President
Nixon to release information, but noting that confidentiality regarding the
President’s conversations and correspondence is generally privileged, and further
noting that this privilege is “fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution”).
17. See RALPH KETCHAM, THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES: THE CLASHES AND THE COMPROMISES THAT
GAVE BIRTH TO OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT at xv (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986)
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were the views of Thomas Paine, who argued, “Society in every
state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a
necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one.”18
This distrust was probably rooted in a variety of
considerations. First, the American Revolution was precipitated by
grievances against the British government, and in particular
alleged abuses by the British monarch.19 Indeed, the U.S.
Declaration of Independence details a long list of purported
grievances against, and alleged abuses by, the British King.20 Not
only had British officials imposed restrictions on freedom of
expression,21 but they had also conducted aggressive searches and
(“Uncertain that any government over so vast a domain as the United States could
be controlled by the people, the anti-federalists saw in the enlarged powers of the
central government only the familiar threats to the rights and liberties of the
people.”).
18. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 3 (Dover Publ’ns 1997) (1776). In full, the
quotation reads as follows:
Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best
state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one; for
when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by a government,
which we might expect in a country without government, our calamity
is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we
suffer.
Id.
19. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) (listing
grievances against the English King). In fact, the British Parliament, rather than
the King, committed some of the alleged offenses.
20. See id. para. 2 (asserting that the King of Great Britain had engaged in
“a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States”). The Declaration
contains a long list of grievances, including the following:
He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of
Officers to harrass [sic] our people, and eat out their substance. He
has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the
Consent of our legislatures. . . . He has abdicated Government here, by
declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. . . . He
has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and
destroyed the lives of our people.
Id.
21. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, FROM GUTENBERG TO THE INTERNET: FREE
SPEECH, ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY 190–91
(2013) (“Previously, in 1606, England had created the crime of seditious libel in
the Star Chamber’s decision in de Libellis Famosis. That decision replaced, in
part, the criminal offense of constructive treason, and made it a crime to criticize
the government or government officials . . . .”).
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seizures.22 However, there was perhaps a second reason for the
new Americans to be fearful of governmental power: many in the
founding generation, or their ancestors, had emigrated from
Europe to the American colonies in an effort to escape religious
persecution.23 Some European nations had created “established”
religions, required everyone to support those religions, and
aggressively persecuted those who tried to practice other
religions.24
Even though the Declaration of Independence made clear that
the power to govern flows from the “consent of the governed,” the
early Americans did not embrace democracy unequivocally. They
instead sought to impose limits on governmental power. Relying
on principles from the Enlightenment,25 including the writings of
22. See Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment, Privacy and Advancing
Technology, 80 MISS. L.J. 1131, 1132 (2011) (“Colonial officials had also used
‘general warrants’ that required them only to specify an offense, and then left it
to the discretion of executing officials to decide which persons should be arrested
and which places should be searched.”).
23. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1947)
A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from
Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support
and attend government favored churches. Catholics had persecuted
Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects
had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief
had persecuted Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these
had from time to time persecuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to
whatever religious group happened to be on top and in league with the
government of a particular time and place, men and women had been
fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed. Among the offenses for
which these punishments had been inflicted were such things as
speaking disrespectfully of the views of ministers of governmentestablished churches, nonattendance at those churches, expressions of
non-belief in their doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to
support them.
24. See id. at 10 (“And all of these dissenters were compelled to pay tithes
and taxes to support government-sponsored churches whose ministers preached
inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen and consolidate the established
faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters.”).
25. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 16–17 (1967)
Despite the efforts that have been made to discount the ‘glittering
generalities’ of the European Enlightenment on eighteenth-century
Americans, their influence remains, and is profoundly illustrated in
the political literature. It is not simply that the great virtuosi of the
American Enlightenment—Franklin, Adams, Jefferson—cited the
classic Enlightenment texts and fought for the legal recognition of

1212

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207 (2015)

individuals such as John Locke,26 Thomas Paine,27 and Baron de
Montesquieu,28 the Framers of the U.S. Constitution sought to
create a system where governmental power was limited and
constrained. Perhaps the most significant restraint was the
doctrine of “separation of powers.” The French philosopher Baron
de Montesquieu is credited with articulating the doctrine in his
landmark essay, The Spirit of the Laws:
[There] is no liberty [if] the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed
to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator.

natural rights and for the elimination of institutions and practices
associated with the ancient régime. . . . The ideas and writings of the
leading secular thinkers of the European Enlightenment—reformers
and social critics like Voltaire, Rousseau, and Beccaria as well as
conservative analysts like Montesquieu – were quoted everywhere in
the colonies, by everyone who claimed a broad awareness. In pamphlet
after pamphlet the American writers cited Locke on natural rights and
on the social and governmental contract, Montesquieu and later
Delolme on the character of British liberty and on the institutional
requirements for its attainment, Voltaire on the evils of clerical
oppression, Beccaria on the reform of criminal law, Grotius, Pufendorf,
Burlamaqui, and Vattel on the laws of nature and of nations, and on
the principles of civil government.
26. See Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective
Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 52, 57, 64–65 (1985) (concluding that it “would be difficult to overstate
John Locke’s influence on the American Revolution and the people who created
the government that followed it” and outlining the influence of Locke on American
political thought); David Thomas Konig, Thomas Jefferson’s Armed Citizenry and
the Republican Militia, 1 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 250, 262 (2008) (noting that
“Jefferson followed Locke in justifying for the American colonies of 1776 the right
of armed resistance”).
27. See Allen Edward Shoenberger, Connecticut Yankee Speech in Europe’s
Court: An Alternative Vision of Constitutional Defamation Law to New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan?, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 431, 432 (2010) (“Free speech, such
as that exemplified by the speeches and pamphlets of the revolutionary firebrand
Thomas Paine, has been at the center of American civil rights.” (citing HARVEY J.
KAYE, THOMAS PAINE: FIREBRAND OF THE REVOLUTION (2000))).
28. See Douglass Adair, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science”: David
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, reprinted in DOUGLASS ADAIR,
FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 93, 95 (1974) (“By the middle of the [eighteenth]
century the French judge and philosophe Montesquieu had produced a
compendium of the behavioral sciences, cutting across all these fields in his
famous study of The Spirit of the Laws.”).
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Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or
the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise
those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the
public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals. 29

The Framers interspersed both “separation of powers” and
“checks and balances” principles throughout the U.S.
Constitution.30 Even though Congress was given the power to
enact legislation, the Constitution required the President’s
signature as a prerequisite to enactment (unless Congress
overrides the President’s veto or the President allows the act to
become law without his signature).31 The President has the power
to appoint “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States,” but he can do so only “with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate.”32 There are many other examples of shared powers:
although Congress and the President jointly enact legislation, the
judiciary is frequently charged with interpreting that legislation
and sometimes with striking it down.33 Moreover, many powers,
such as the foreign affairs power, are shared between the President
and Congress.34 For example, the Senate is charged with ratifying
29. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 151 (Cosimo Classics 2011)
(1750).
30. See KETCHAM, supra note 17, at xv (“Also, mindful of colonial experience
and following the arguments of Montesquieu, the idea that the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers had to be ‘separated,’ made to ‘check and balance’
each other in order to prevent tyranny, gained wide acceptance.”).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds
of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
32. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
33. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the
Court’s power of judicial review of legislative actions).
34. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(finding that because “the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation,” Congress may provide the President with greater
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treaties, which the Constitution charges the President to negotiate
and make,35 but only the entire Congress can declare war.36 The
President is integrally involved in other foreign affairs issues as
well.37 In addition, the Framers created different terms of office for
different officials so that a single election could not dramatically
shift the course and direction of government.38 Citations to
Montesquieu’s arguments regarding separation of powers appear
in the Federalist Papers39 and the debates at the constitutional
convention.40 Moreover, the doctrines of “separation of powers” and
“checks and balances” are frequently cited and discussed in early
documents.41
The NSA cybersurveillance program raises fundamental
issues regarding separation of powers. Unquestionably, every
branch of government is involved with the program to some extent.
Congress passed legislation authorizing the program, and the
discretion in external matters than would be afforded domestically).
35. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He [the President] shall have Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur.”).
36. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to declare
War.”).
37. See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 (“The President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States . . . .”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for
six Years. . . .”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the
Term of four Years. . . .”); see also KETCHAM, supra note 17, at xvii (“Thus, for
example, even though an upper and a lower house might each eventually derive
from the people, different districts, different terms of office, different modes of
election, and different definitions of authority would create balances of power.”).
39. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), reprinted in ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 139 (Emereo
Publ’g 2012) (“One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable
adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim,
that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate
and distinct.”).
40. See KETCHAM, supra note 17, at 85, 237, 249, 253, 260, 288, 339, 360
(referencing various arguments of Montesquieu regarding separation of powers).
41. See id. at 159–60, 163, 166–67, 240, 247, 259–60, 357 (discussing the
doctrines of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances”).
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President and his subordinates were charged with carrying it out.
In addition, the judiciary, albeit secret courts, were charged with
issuing warrants allowing the NSA to take various types of action.
Secrecy was enhanced by the fact that the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 197842 provided that applications for
search warrants would be governed by two courts whose orders
were classified as “secret.”43 However, there is evidence suggesting
that the NSA actively sought to evade the checks and balances
built into the U.S. system. Not only was the NSA not forthcoming
with information, but NSA Director, James Clapper, even lied to
Congress about the program.44 When he was asked whether the
NSA was collecting “any type of data at all on millions or hundreds
of millions of Americans,” he flatly stated, “No, sir. Not
wittingly.”45 Clapper later sought to explain the lie by suggesting
that it was the “most truthful” or “least untruthful” thing that he
could say at the time.46
II. The NSA and Democratic Accountability
The NSA cybersurveillance also raises democratic
accountability concerns. Of course, democratic principles have not
always been in vogue. When the U.S. Constitution was created,
42. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012).
43. See id. § 1805(a)(3), (b) (outlining the requirements for a judge to issue
an electronic surveillance search warrant).
44. See Editorial Board, Edward Snowden, Whistle Blower, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
2, 2014, at A18 (“[Snowden’s] leaks revealed that James Clapper Jr., the director
of national intelligence, lied to Congress when testifying in March that the N.S.A.
was not collecting data on millions of Americans. (There has been no discussion
of punishment for that lie.)”); Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Leaker Denies
Giving Secrets to China, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2013, at A5 (suggesting that
Snowden decided to go public because Director Clapper had lied to the American
public regarding the NSA data collection program); Andrew Rosenthal, Clapper
and Carney Get Slippery on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES THE OPINION PAGES, (Oct.
24, 2013), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/ clapper-and-carneyget-slippery-on-surveillance/?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (“James Clapper,
the director of national intelligence who once excused a lie to Congress by
explaining that it was ‘the most truthful or least untruthful’ thing he could say,
issued another burst of fog . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
45. Savage & Shane, supra note 44.
46. Rosenthal, supra note 44.
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monarchy was the dominant form of government in Europe. At one
point, some monarchies tried to justify their existence through the
concept of “Divine Right,”47 the idea that monarchs have been
placed on their thrones by God; are divinely inspired and guided;
and are carrying out God’s will through their actions.48 Of course,
if a King is carrying out God’s will, there is no legitimate place for
democratic accountability. After all, why would society allow
common people to criticize what God has done or allow them to
hold the monarch accountable for God’s actions?
Because of these views, many monarchies imposed speech
restrictions. Indeed, following Johannes Gutenberg’s development
of the printing press in the fifteenth century,49 some governments
actively restricted the ability of ordinary people to use the printing
press to communicate ideas.50 In addition to placing limits on the
total number of presses that could exist,51 governments also
imposed licensing restrictions on the content of publications.52
47. However, many in the founding generation rejected the notion of Divine
Right altogether. See PAINE, supra note 18, at 6 (“There is something exceedingly
ridiculous in the composition of monarchy; it first excludes a man from the means
of information, yet empowers him to act in cases where the highest judgment is
required.”). Thomas Paine, who was British born, but who was in the American
colonies during the Revolutionary period and who wrote extensively, expressed
serious reservations regarding the British monarchy’s claim to rule by Divine
Right:
[N]o man in his senses can say that [the British monarchs’ claim to the
throne] under William the Conquerer is a very honorable one. A
French bastard landing with an armed banditti, and establishing
himself king of England against the consent of the natives, is in plain
terms a very paltry rascally original.—It certainly hath no divinity in
it.
Id. at 13–14.
48. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96 (1996) (noting that
“centuries ago” there was a “belief that the monarch served by divine right”).
49. See DAVID CROWLEY & PAUL HEYER, COMMUNICATION IN HISTORY:
TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, SOCIETY 82 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the printing press
revolution in the mid-fifteenth century).
50. See generally id.
51. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, CATHERINE HANCOCK, & JOHN C. KNECHTLE, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 5 (4th ed. 2014) (“Even after
the English licensing laws were abandoned, government retained the power to
prosecute for seditious libel . . . .”).
52. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002) (“The English
licensing system expired at the end of the 17th century, but the memory of its
abuses was still vivid enough in colonial times that Blackstone warned against
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They also sometimes criminalized speech.53 For example, in 1606,
England’s Star Chambers created the crime of seditious libel in de
Libellis Famosis,54 thereby making it a crime to criticize the King
and other governmental officials (and, at one point, the clergy as
well).55 The crime was enforced by “threats of punishment,
litigation costs, and stigma”56 and was justified by the notion that
criticism of the government “inculcated a disrespect for public
authority.”57 “Since maintaining a proper regard for government
was the goal of the offense, it followed that truth was just as
reprehensible as falsehood[,]” and therefore, truth was not a
defense.58 Indeed, truthful criticisms were punished more severely
than false criticisms on the assumption that truthful criticisms
were potentially more damaging to the government.59 To those who
the ‘restrictive power’ of such . . . an administrative official who enjoyed
unconfined authority to pass judgment on the content of speech.”).
53. See generally de Libellis Famosis, (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (defining and
establishing the crime of seditious libel in England).
54. See generally id. (establishing seditious libel as a crime in England).
55. See William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process:
Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior
Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 248 (1982) (“These Acts,
unfortunately, did not adequately circumscribe the authority of these
bureaucratic licensers. They enjoyed broad and vague powers to suppress the
many false . . . scandalous, seditious and libelous works . . . published to the great
defamation of Religion and government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, in de Libellis Famosis, the defendants had ridiculed high clergy. See de
Libellis Famosis, (1606) 77 Eng.Rep. 250, at 251
In the case of L. P. in the Star-Chamber this term, against whom the
Attorney-General proceeded ore tenus on his own confession, for
composing and publishing an infamous libel in verse, by which John
Archbishop of Canterbury (who was a prelate of singular piety, gravity,
and learning, now dead) by descriptions and circumlocutions, and not in
express terms; and Richard Bishop of Canterbury who now is, were
traduced and scandalized . . . .
56. William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom
of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984).
57. Id. at 103; see also Matt J. O’Laughlin, Exigent Circumstances:
Circumscribing the Exclusionary Rule in Response to 9/11, 70 UMKC L. REV. 707,
720–21 (2002) (describing the arrest and imprisonment of John Wilkes for
criticizing King George III).
58. Mayton, supra note 56, at 103.
59. See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to
Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 184
n.290 (1999) (“In fact, the English rule was that the greater the truth, the greater
the libel.”).
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regarded the concept of Divine Right as legitimate, such
restrictions might have made sense.
By the eighteenth century, when the United States was
established, many European philosophers had become highly
skeptical of monarchy, Divine Right, and hereditary succession,60
and were openly questioning the legitimacy of monarchically based
governmental systems.61 Thomas Paine, who was of British birth
but who was living in the American colonies at the time of the
Revolution, argued that monarchs become “poisoned by
importance” and ultimately are “the most ignorant and unfit of any
throughout the dominions.”62 He went on to note:

60. See, e.g., PAINE, supra note 18, at 12–13 (calling hereditary succession
“an insult and an imposition on posterity”). Paine elaborated:
For all men being originally equals, no one by birth could have a right
to set up his own family in perpetual preference to all others for
ever. . . . Most wise men, in their private sentiments, have ever treated
hereditary right with contempt; yet it is one of those evils, when once
established is not easily removed.
Id. (emphasis in original).
61. See id. at 8
But there is another and greater distinction for which no truly natural
or religious reason can be assigned, and that is, the distinction of men
into KINGS and SUBJECTS. Male and female are the distinctions of
nature, good and bad the distinctions of heaven, but how a race of men
came into the world so exalted above the rest, and distinguished like
some new species, is worth enquiring into, and whether they are the
means of happiness or misery to mankind.
Paine continued:
As the exalting [of] one man so greatly above the rest cannot be
justified on the equal rights of nature, so neither can it be defended on
the authority of scripture; for the will of the Almighty, as declared by
Gideon and the prophet Samuel, expressly disapproves of government
by kings.
Id. at 9.
62. Id. at 15. In full, the quotation reads as follows:
Men who look upon themselves born to reign, and others to obey, some
grow insolent; selected from the rest of mankind their minds are early
poisoned by importance; and the world they act in differs so materially
from the world at large, that they have but little opportunity of
knowing its true interests, and when they succeed to the government
are frequently the most ignorant and unfit of any throughout the
dominions.
Id.
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How came the king by a power which the people are afraid to trust,
and always obliged to check? Such a power could not be the gift of
a wise people, neither can any power, which needs checking, be
from God; yet the provision, which the [British] constitution
makes, supposes such a power to exist.63

In establishing the United States, the founding generation
rejected monarchy and Divine Right as justifiable bases for
governmental authority.64 Inspired by such documents as Cato’s
Letters,65 and the thoughts of European philosophers such as Locke,66

63. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
64. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
(“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.”).
65. See Michael Kent Curtis, St. George Tucker and the Legacy of Slavery, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1157, 1206 (2006) (“Cato’s Letters were a series of essays on
liberty that were widely circulated in the colonies and the United States both
before and after the Revolution.”); Dan Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual
and Conceptual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era State Declarations of Rights
of Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 970 (2002) (“The
description of the freedom of the press as a ‘bulwark of liberty’ apparently
originates with Cato’s Letters, a series of essays by two English pamphleteers,
widely reprinted and quoted in the American colonies.”); Paige Gold, Fair Use and
the First Amendment: Corporate Control of Copyright is Stifling DocumentaryMaking and Thwarting the Aims of the First Amendment, 15 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 12 (2006) (“John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, two widely-read
British political thinkers whose essays were published in the colonies as Cato’s
Letters, identified three central values that the right of free speech is designed to
advance . . . .”).
66. See Doernberg, supra note 26, at 64–65 (concluding that it “would be
difficult to overstate John Locke’s influence on the American Revolution and the
people who created the government that followed it”); Konig, supra note 26, at
262 (noting that “Jefferson followed Locke in justifying for the American colonies
of 1776 the right of armed resistance”).
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Paine,67 and Baron de Montesquieu,68 they implicitly rejected the
notion of Divine Right in the Declaration of Independence and opted
for an entirely new basis for the exercise of governmental authority:
“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed.”69 In addition, they embraced the
idea of self-determination: “If an existing government becomes
repressive, the people have the right to throw it off and replace it
with another form of government that seems most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness.”70 In other words, power flows from
the people to the government, rather than the other way around.71
Granted, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not fully
and unequivocally embrace democracy. Under the Constitution,
U.S. Senators were not directly elected by the people of the United
States.72 Rather, they were chosen by the state legislatures.73 Even
67. See Shoenberger, supra note 27, at 432 (“Free speech, such as that
exemplified by the speeches and pamphlets of the revolutionary firebrand
Thomas Paine, has been at the center of American civil rights.” (citing HARVEY J.
KAYE, THOMAS PAINE: FIREBRAND OF THE REVOLUTION (2000))); see also IRVING
FANG, A HISTORY OF MASS COMMUNICATION: SIX INFORMATION REVOLUTIONS 49
(1997)
Over the course of a century that began with the Industrial Revolution,
the American Revolution and the French Revolution, the Western
World underwent a tremendous alteration. Printing played a
significant role in all three revolutions . . . . Pamphlets such as Tom
Paine’s Common Sense spread the revolt to the American Revolution.
And printing awakened France and shook all of Europe with its
Declaration of the Rights of Man.
68. See Adair, supra note 28, at 95 (“By the middle of the [eighteenth]
century the French judge and philosophe Montesquieu had produced a
compendium of the behavioral sciences, cutting across all these fields in his
famous study of The Spirit of the Laws.”).
69. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Emps.
of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 323 (1973) (“Our discomfort with sovereign immunity, born of systems of
divine right that the Framers abhorred, is thus entirely natural.”).
70. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
71. See Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 322–23 (“‘We the People’
formed the governments of the several States. Under our constitutional system,
therefore, a State is not the sovereign of its people. Rather, its people are
sovereign.”).
72. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall
be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof . . . .”).
73. See id. (declaring that the Senate shall be chosen by the legislature of
each state).
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today, the President is not directly elected but is chosen through
the Electoral College.74 Moreover, through the concepts of
separation of powers and checks and balances, the Framers sought
to restrain and control the exercise of governmental authority.
Finally, the people of the United States demanded inclusion of a
Bill of Rights as part of the constitutional structure.75
Despite the distrust of government, over time the concept of
democracy took root in the United States, and the Declaration of
Independence’s focus on the “consent of the governed” has gained
ascendance. In addition, the notion that individuals have the right
to freely debate the wisdom of governmental actions, as well as the
merits (or demerits) of candidates for political office, is well
accepted. As democratic principles began to take root, and
monarchy was supplanted or limited by democracy, speech
restrictions became anathema to the nature of government. In a
democracy, the ultimate check on governmental authority comes
from the electorate’s ability to choose their representatives.76
Criticism of governmental officials and governmental actions and
the concept of democratic accountability lie at the heart of the U.S.
governmental system and require a degree of governmental
transparency and openness.
Of course, the fundamental dilemma presented by the NSA
data collection program is that it was (before the Snowden
disclosures) conducted almost entirely in secret. Governmental
officials deceived the American public regarding the nature and

74. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1–3 (declaring that each state shall appoint electors
who vote for the president).
75. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 769 (2010) (“But those
who were fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe traditional
rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the adoption of the Bill
of Rights as a condition for ratification of the Constitution.”).
76. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) (discussing the importance of the people’s
ability to vote for representatives to checking the power of the government);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971) (same); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963) (same); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (same); RUSSELL L. WEAVER,
UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10–13 (5th ed. 2014) (same).
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scope of that program.77 They even lied to Congress.78 Secrecy was
paramount. The government issued National Security Letters to
large telecommunications companies, requiring them to turn over
data to the NSA and ordering the companies not to publicly
acknowledge the letters or the disclosures, or even alert their
customers regarding the nature and scope of NSA inquiries.79 NSA
search warrants were (and are) issued by secret courts, and the
warrants and the court orders were (and are) classified as “secret”
and withheld from the public.80 To the extent that individuals
attempted to challenge the NSA program in court, they were met
with more secrecy.81
In other words, it was extremely difficult for the public to
ascertain the nature or scope of the operation, much less to hold
governmental officials accountable. Of course, government may
have a legitimate basis for classifying certain types of documents
as “secret” and for shielding them from public view. Even in a
democracy, not everything should be publicly available. However,
the extent of NSA’s secrecy went beyond permissible bounds. In a
democratic society, premised on the consent of the governed,
society must have some opportunity to debate and evaluate the
legitimacy of the NSA surveillance program, as well as to establish
appropriate limitations on governmental power. Even though some
aspects of the program might justifiably be shielded from public
disclosure to protect national security, the extraordinary level of
secrecy associated with the NSA’s cybersurveillance program is
fundamentally inconsistent with the demands and expectations of
77. See generally Shane, supra note 9 (describing President Obama’s
reassurance that the NSA was not listening to the American people’s phone calls).
78. See Editorial Board, supra note 44, at A18 (describing director of national
security James Clapper’s lie to Congress that the NSA was not knowingly
collecting data on millions of Americans); see generally Rosenthal, supra note 44.
79. See Shane, supra note 1, at A10 (“The agency, using a combination of
jawboning, stealth and legal force, has turned the nation’s Internet and
telecommunications companies into collection partners, installing filters in their
facilities, serving them with court orders, building back doors into their software
and acquiring keys to break their encryption.”); Stanglin, supra note 1 (discussing
how the NSA forced companies to maintain the secrecy of its spying program).
80. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3), (b) (2012) (outlining the requirements for a
judge to issue an electronic surveillance search warrant).
81. See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)
(holding that Amnesty International lacked standing to challenge FISA).
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a free society. The question is one of balance, and there was no
balance with the NSA program. Secrecy pervaded the program,
ignoring and trampling the concept of democratic accountability.
Absent the Snowden disclosures, the public might still be unaware
of the nature or extent of the program. At least now, in light of
those disclosures, the nation is able to debate the propriety and
scope of the surveillance program.
III. The Fourth Amendment as a Limitation on the NSA
Surveillance Program
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution82 provides a
potential check on the NSA surveillance program. Interestingly,
even though the Framers of the U.S. Constitution viewed the
concepts of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances” as
sufficient, in and of themselves, to protect the people against
governmental abuse, many of the people did not. As a result, when
the Framers of the U.S. Constitution decided not to include a bill
of rights on the theory that they had created a government of
limited and enumerated powers and one whose power would be
sufficiently checked by the doctrines of separation of powers and
checks and balances, the people balked.83 It rapidly became clear
that the Constitution might not have enough support to gain
ratification without the addition of a bill of rights. In an effort to
salvage the process, proponents urged ratification of the
Constitution “as is,” but promised that the first Congress would
create what became the Bill of Rights.84 Only then was ratification
possible.85 As a result, the Bill of Rights entered the Constitution
82. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)
(“During the debates in the Thirteen Colonies over ratification of the
Constitution, one of the arguments frequently used by opponents of ratification
was that without a Bill of Rights guaranteeing individual liberty the new general
Government carried with it a potential for tyranny.”).
84. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 769 (2010) (“But those
who were fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe traditional
rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the adoption of the Bill
of Rights as a condition for ratification of the Constitution.”).
85. See id. (discussing the states’ insistence on the adoption of a bill of rights
as a condition for the Constitution’s ratification); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The first 10 Amendments were not
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as a series of amendments rather than as a part of the Constitution
itself.86
An essential component of the Bill of Rights was the Fourth
Amendment, which limited the government’s authority to conduct
searches and seizures.87 Abuses during the British colonial period
motivated the founding generation’s push for Fourth Amendment
protections.88 British colonial officials had used Writs of Assistance
that required them to do no more than specify the object of a search
to obtain a warrant that allowed them to search any place where
the evidence might be found.89 There was no limit as to place or
duration.90 Colonial officials had also used “general warrants” that
required them only to specify an offense and then left it to the
discretion of those officials to decide which persons should be
arrested and which places should be searched.91

enacted because the members of the First Congress came up with a bright idea
one morning; rather, their enactment was forced upon Congress by a number of
the States as a condition for their ratification of the original Constitution.”).
86. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769 (discussing how the Bill of Rights only
entered the Constitution because states insisted upon it as a condition for
ratification).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.”).
88. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 64–
65 (3d ed. 2008) (“The debate (and the anger) in the American colonies about the
arbitrary use of these writs of assistance by the English ‘was perhaps the most
prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the
oppressions of the mother country.”’ (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
625 (1886))); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990)
(“[T]he driving force behind the adoption of the [Fourth] Amendment . . . was
widespread hostility among the former Colonists to the issuance of writs of
assistance. . . . [T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people
of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government.”).
89. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1131–227 (describing the use of Writs of
Assistance to search people and property with wide discretion).
90. See id. (noting the lack of limitations or restrictions on the Writs of
Assistance).
91. See id. at 1132 (“Colonial officials had also used ‘general warrants’ that
required them only to specify an offense, and then left it to the discretion of
executing officials to decide which persons should be arrested and which places
should be searched.”).
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In the Fourth Amendment, the founding generation sought to
cabin the new government’s authority to engage in searches and
seizures and limit the possibilities for abuse. In general, the
Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” searches and
seizures.92 Although that Amendment does not mandate the
issuance of a search warrant as a precondition to a search, it does
provide that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”93
Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly protect
individual privacy, it did seek to protect people, as well as their
houses, papers, and effects.94
Although the Fourth Amendment has generally provided the
citizenry with substantial protections against “unreasonable
searches and seizures,”95 the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to
deal with the problem of advancing technology like that being used
by the NSA.96 Part of the problem is that the state of technology
was far less advanced in the eighteenth century so that the authors
of the Fourth Amendment were not concerned with cyber-searches,
but instead were worried about actual physical searches of persons
and places.97 As a result, Supreme Court precedent had historically
92. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
93. Id.
94. See id. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects . . . shall not be violated . . . .”).
95. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (holding that the
search of the defendant's vehicle while he was handcuffed in a patrol car was
unreasonable); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the
warrantless use of thermal imaging technology to “see” what was going on inside
a home was unreasonable); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (holding
that police exceeded the limits of an investigative stop when they asked defendant
to accompany them to a small police room, retained his ticket and driver’s license,
and in no way indicated that he was free to depart); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
654 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by unconstitutional search was
inadmissible).
96. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1137 (“[E]arly United States Supreme
Court decisions dealing with technology and the Fourth Amendment . . . were
virtually unresponsive (except in the dissents) to the problems presented by new
technologies.”).
97. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 308 n.1 (1959) (“The Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides: ‘The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
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tended to limit the Fourth Amendment’s application to situations
in which the police actually searched a person98 or trespassed onto
a “constitutionally protected area.”99 The Court’s approach became
problematic as technology advanced to the point that the police
could infringe privacy interests without actually trespassing or
intruding into a constitutionally protected area.100
By the beginning of the twentieth century, as electricity came
into widespread use and new technologies were invented, the
Court began to confront situations in which the police or
governmental officials would aggressively use technology in police
investigations.101 In these early cases, the Court was dealing with
relatively crude technologies such as “detectaphones,”102 “spike
mikes,”103 and wiretaps.104 Except when the technology actually
penetrated into a “constitutionally protected area,” such as a home
(for example, in the case of the spike mike which was inserted into
someone’s home to overhear conversations inside the home),105 the
Court refused to hold that the use of such technologies to spy on

98. See id. at 314 (holding that an agent had probable cause and reasonable
grounds for believing that the defendant was violating federal laws on narcotic
drugs, and therefore heroin discovered in search incident to lawful arrest was
competent evidence).
99. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding “that
the use of the detectaphone by Government agents was not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (“We
think, therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search
or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
100. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1137 (“[E]arly United States Supreme
Court decisions dealing with technology and the Fourth Amendment . . . were
virtually unresponsive (except in the dissents) to the problems presented by new
technologies.”).
101. See id. (describing the Court’s early struggles with application of the
Fourth Amendment to emerging police technologies such as wiretapping).
102. See Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134 (“We hold that what was heard by the use
of the detectaphone was not made illegal by trespass or unlawful entry.”).
103. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961) (noting “the
officers employed a so-called ‘spike mike’ to listen to what was going on within
the four walls of the house next door”).
104. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding “that the wire tapping here
disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment”).
105. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (holding that the use of spike mikes
violated the Fourth Amendment).
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citizens constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.106
However, by the early part of the twentieth century, individual
justices were beginning to raise concerns regarding the potentially
adverse impact of intrusive technologies on individual privacy. In
Olmstead v. United States,107 with a degree of prescience, a
dissenting Justice Brandeis argued that the “progress of
science . . . is not likely to stop with wire tapping,” and may some
day allow the government “without removing papers from secret
drawers” to “expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home.”108 Justice Brandeis argued that, rather than inquiring
whether the government has intruded into a “constitutionally
protected area,” the courts should focus on whether government
had trampled on the “indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property.”109 In Goldman v. United
States,110 a dissenting Justice Murphy relied on Justice Brandeis
and Samuel Warren’s seminal article on privacy111 to argue that
the Fourth Amendment should be broadly interpreted to protect
“the individual against unwarranted intrusions by others into his
private affairs,”112 and that the Court should provide greater
protection for individual privacy.113 Despite these dissents, the
Court continued to focus on whether government had intruded into
a “constitutionally protected area.”
By the second half of the twentieth century, the Court itself
was becoming more sensitive to the intrusive possibilities of newer
106. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding that the
use of a detectaphone did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the use of wire tapping did not
violate the Fourth Amendment).
107. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
108. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 474–75.
110. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
111. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
112. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
113. See id. at 139 (“Whether the search of private quarters is accomplished
by . . . detectaphone . . . , or by new methods of photography . . . , the privacy of
the citizen is equally invaded by agents of the Government and intimate personal
matters are laid bare to view.”).
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technologies. In Silverman v. United States114 the Court expressed
concern in dicta regarding “the Fourth Amendment implications of
these and other frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted
marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society.”115 A
mere six years later, the Court rendered its landmark decision in
Katz v. United States116 and mapped out a completely new
approach for handling advancing technologies under the Fourth
Amendment. Instead of asking whether the police had intruded
into a “constitutionally protected area” (which, of course, would
still constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment), the Court inquired whether the government had
violated an individual’s “expectation of privacy.”117 A concurring
Justice Harlan essentially agreed with the Court but argued that
the expectation of privacy must be one that society recognizes as
“reasonable.”118 The Harlan formulation was the one that the
Court ultimately adopted.
The Katz test seemingly expanded the Fourth Amendment’s
application to advancing technologies. In that case, Katz made a
phone call from a telephone booth, and the police overheard the
conversation because of a listening device attached to the outside
of the booth.119 Based on prior precedent, the prosecution argued
that there had been no intrusion into a “constitutionally protected
area” because a phone booth was not a protected area (like a
home).120 Moreover, the government had not “trespassed” into the
114. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
115. Id. at 509.
116. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
117. See id. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”).
118. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.”).
119. See id. at 348 (majority opinion) (discussing “evidence of the petitioner’s
end of telephone conversation, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone
booth from which he had placed his calls”).
120. See id. at 351 (“The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was
a ‘constitutionally protected area.’ The Government has maintained with equal
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phone booth because it had simply attached a listening device to
the outside to capture sound waves emanating from the booth.121
Despite the absence of a trespass, the Court found that the
government’s use of the listening device constituted a search
because the government had violated Katz’s reasonable
expectation of privacy (REOP): “One who occupies [a phone booth],
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to
place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”122
After Katz, one might have assumed that the Court had
sufficiently restricted the government’s ability to use new
technologies to intrude on personal privacy. However, as the Court
struggled to apply the Katz formulation in subsequent cases, it
rapidly became clear that the REOP test did not provide much
protection against the onslaught of technology.123 Although the
Court has rendered some post-Katz technology decisions that are
privacy-protective,124 the general thrust of the Court’s
jurisprudence has been largely search-permissive.125 The problem
is that the Court has narrowly construed the REOP test in a way
that provides little protection against electronic intrusions.126
Indeed, in a number of cases, the Court has found that individuals
do not have an REOP even though a reasonable person might very
vigor that it was not.”).
121. See id. at 352 (“The Government contends, however, that the activities
of its agents in this case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment
requirements, for the surveillance technique they employed involved no physical
penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls.”).
122. Id.
123. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1138 (“[T]he Katz test has been narrowly
construed and has not easily adapted to new technologies.”).
124. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (determining that
the police may not search the electronic contents of an individual’s cell phone,
incident to arrest, despite precedent suggesting that the police can search “closed
containers” as part of such a search); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)
(finding that the use of Forward Looking Infrared Technology to determine the
amount of heat emanating from a home (to determine whether the owner might
be using lights to grow marijuana in his attic) constituted a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
125. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1138 (“Katz offered substantial hope to
those who were concerned about the advance of technology and the potential
implications for privacy. However, Katz has not lived up to that promise . . . .”).
126. See id. (discussing how the Katz test has been narrowly construed).
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well have concluded otherwise. For example, the Court has held
that individuals do not have an REOP in so-called “open fields”
even if they are fenced and posted with “no trespassing” signs,127
against helicopters hovering at low altitudes over their homes,128
against surreptitious examination of garbage that they leave on
the street for the garbage collector,129 against canine sniffs
designed to uncover whether a passenger is carrying illegal drugs
in a suitcase,130 or against the use of ground-tracking devices that
are used to follow the movements of their automobiles131 (except
when the device is used to uncover information about the inside of
a home,132 or the police commit a trespass in installing the device
on a vehicle133).

127. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[O]pen fields
do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.”).
128. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (finding that an
officer’s observation, with his naked eye, of the interior of a partially covered
greenhouse in residential backyard from vantage point of helicopter circling 400
feet above did not constitute a “search” for which a warrant was required);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that warrantless aerial
observation of fenced-in backyard within curtilage of home was not unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
239 (1986) (announcing that aerial photography of chemical company’s industrial
complex was not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.).
129. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 45 (1988) (determining
that defendants did not have reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment in garbage which they placed in opaque bags outside their
house for collection by trash collector).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (deciding that
exposure of luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding that
monitoring the signal of a beeper placed in a container of chemicals that were
being transported to the owner’s cabin did not invade any legitimate expectation
of privacy on the cabin owner’s part and, therefore, there was neither a “search”
nor a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (explaining that
the Government is not completely free to determine by means of electric device,
without warrant and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a
particular article or person is in an individual’s home at particular time).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (announcing
that attachment of Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to vehicle,
and subsequent use of that device to monitor vehicle’s movements on public
streets, was a search within meaning of Fourth Amendment).
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Perhaps the most restrictive limitation on the Katz test comes
from the notion that there is no REOP for information that is
“voluntarily conveyed to a third party.”134 In Smith v. Maryland,135
the Court held that the police did not violate an individual’s REOP
when it installed a pen register that allowed them to mechanically
record all of the phone numbers dialed by the individual.136 The
recording was done at the phone company, rather than through an
intrusion into the individual’s home, and the Court held that an
individual has no “legitimate expectation of privacy” in things that
he “voluntarily turns over to third parties,” including to the phone
company’s mechanical equipment.137 Likewise, in United States v.
Miller,138 the Court held that an individual did not retain an REOP
in his bank records that were being held by his bank because they
had been voluntarily turned over to a third party.139 Finally, in
Couch v. United States,140 the Court held that a client could not
claim an REOP in his own documents that were in the possession
of a third party (his accountant).141
134. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (holding that
installation and use of a pen register by a telephone company does not constitute
a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) (determining that a bank depositor had no
protectable Fourth Amendment interest in bank records, consisting of microfilms
or checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to his accounts at two banks,
maintained pursuant to Bank Secrecy Act and obtained by allegedly defective
subpoenas); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (holding that, where
taxpayer hired an independent accountant to whom she had delivered regularly
over a period of years various business and tax records which remained in his
continuous possession, taxpayer’s divestment of possession of such records
disqualified her entirely as object of any impermissible Fifth Amendment
compulsion).
135. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
136. See id. at 745–46 (“The installation and use of a pen register,
consequently, was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.”).
137. See id. at 774–75 (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing,
petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers
he dialed.”).
138. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
139. See id. at 440 (noting that Miller could not assert either ownership or
possession over the records because the bank was required to keep them pursuant
to its statutory obligations).
140. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
141. See id. at 335 (“[T]here can be little expectation of privacy where records
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If literally applied, the “voluntarily turned over to a third
party” doctrine creates a gaping hole in the Fourth Amendment
and suggests that the Fourth Amendment provides almost no
protection against the NSA’s massive surveillance operation. In a
modern, technologically driven society, most people convey a large
amount of information through third parties. Emails are routinely
sent through Internet service providers (ISPs), and text messages
are routinely sent through service providers like Verizon, AT&T,
and T-Mobile. Even phone calls are made through phone
companies. Of course, Katz itself involved a phone call placed
through the phone company, and the Court concluded that Katz
was protected by an REOP.142 However, in light of decisions like
Smith, Miller, and Couch, it is not clear that emails, phone calls,
and text messages are accompanied by an REOP today.
All is not lost. In recent years, the Court has shown somewhat
greater sensitivity towards privacy issues. Indeed, in a couple of
recent decisions, the Court has protected individuals against police
attempts to use technology to obtain information regarding the
interior of their homes. For example, in Kyllo v. United States,143
the Court held that the police had violated a homeowner’s REOP
when they used forward-looking infrared technology (FLIR) to
determine the amount of heat emanating from his home.144 The
police suspected, correctly as it turned out, that the occupants were
using special lights to grow marijuana in their attic.145 The Court
stated that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public
are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the
information therein is required in an income tax return.”).
142. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) (finding that the search
and seizure would have been constitutional if it had been carried out with prior
authorization from a magistrate that narrowly limited its scope).
143. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
144. See id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”).
145. See id. at 30 (“Agent Elliott concluded that petitioner was using halide
lights to grow marijuana in his house, which indeed he was.”).
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use.”146 Likewise, in Florida v. Jardines,147 the Court held that the
police committed a search when they entered the curtilage of
Jardines’ home to have a narcotics-detection dog sniff at an
individual’s front door.148 However, in that case, the Court did not
apply the REOP test but instead focused on the fact that the
officers and the dog had committed a physical intrusion into the
constitutionally protected area of the curtilage of defendant’s
home.149 The difficulty is that, despite the Court’s protectiveness
towards the home, it has provided little protection against
governmental surveillance of communications sent from a person’s
home.
There are indications that some individual U.S. Supreme
Court justices are becoming concerned regarding the intrusiveness
of modern technologies. For example, in City of Ontario v. Quon,150
the Court suggested that it was uncomfortable with the results
that the REOP test produced.151 Quon involved the question of
whether a member of a police SWAT team possessed an REOP in
text messages that he sent and received on a wireless pager that
the City issued for his use for work-related purposes.152 The police
department investigated the officer and others after they
repeatedly exceeded their monthly limits on messages, seeking to
determine whether the limits were too low or whether
departmental rules related to non-work-related messages had
been violated.153 The audit revealed that most of one officer’s
messages were not work-related, and he was disciplined.154 He
filed suit, arguing that the audit violated his Fourth Amendment
146. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
147. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
148. See id. at 1417–18 (focusing on a Fourth Amendment property rights
baseline).
149. See id. at 1414–15 (describing curtilage as “an area adjacent to the home
and to which the activity of home life extends”).
150. 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010).
151. See id. at 757 (discussing the test found in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987) as an alternative to the one found in Katz).
152. See id. at 750–51 (explaining the purpose of the SWAT pagers was to
assist the SWAT team in mobilization).
153. See id. at 752 (describing the text messages as public information that
was available for auditing).
154. See id. (mentioning that some of the text messages were explicit in
nature).
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rights.155 In deciding the case, the Court assumed that Quon had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his messages but expressed
hesitance to establish fixed rules regarding the application of
Fourth Amendment rules to emerging technologies: “The judiciary
risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment
implications of emerging technology before its role in society has
become clear.”156 In some respects, this hesitance was staggering.
After all, the Court had been struggling with the implications of
technology for nearly a century.157 Of course, there was some sense
in the Quon Court’s observations. As the Court noted, the
“dynamics of communication and information transmission” are
changing rapidly, as are societal expectations regarding what
should be regarded as proper and improper behavior, and the
Court worried about its ability to predict “how employees’ privacy
expectations will be shaped by those changes or the degree to
which society will be prepared to recognize those expectations as
reasonable.”158
Another hopeful decision was rendered in Riley v.
California,159 in which the Court held that the police could not
routinely search digital information on a cell phone as part of a
search incident to legal arrest.160 In one of the fact scenarios
presented in that case, after an individual was stopped for driving
with expired license plates and arrested, the police suspected that
the arrestee was associated with gang activity and decided to
search his smart phone.161 Although the Court reaffirmed the
search-incident-to-arrest exception, the Court invalidated the

155. See id. at 753 (claiming, in addition to Fourth Amendment violations, the
audit violated the Stored Communications Act).
156. Id. at 759.
157. See Lawrence Hurley, In U.S., When High-Tech Meets High Court, High
Jinks Ensue, REUTERS (May 9, 2014, 1:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/05/09/us-usa-court-tech-idUSBREA480N420140509 (last visited
June 5, 2015) (describing recent mishaps of Justices’ use of technological terms)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
158. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759–60 (2010).
159. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
160. See id. at 2485 (holding that officers must obtain warrants before
conducting searches of cell phones).
161. See id. at 2480 (highlighting that the police found incriminating
information regarding two gangs, the Crips and the Bloods).

CYBERSURVEILLANCE IN A FREE SOCIETY

1235

search.162 In doing so, the Court emphasized that individuals are
entitled to privacy against governmental intrusion into their
private affairs and described smart phones as “minicomputers”
that have the potential to function as telephones as well as
“cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders,
libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, and newspapers,” and
can contain “millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or
hundreds of videos.”163 As a result, using a smart phone, the “sum
of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a
thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and
descriptions,” can reveal a user’s Internet searches, browsing
history, and personal movements.164 Consequently, the Court
regarded a search of a smart phone as quite different than the use
of the pen register in Smith v. Maryland.165
In Riley, in evaluating the validity of the government’s action,
the Court balanced “the degree [to which a search] intrudes upon
an individual’s privacy” against “the degree to which it is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”166 Because
the digital data “stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a
weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s
escape,” the Court concluded that the police could not search it
except to determine whether it is being used to conceal a weapon
(for example, a razor blade).167 Even though the Court was aware
of the fact that a smart phone might be vulnerable to two different
types of evidence destruction—remote wiping and data
encryption—the Court viewed these concerns as remote given that
the government had offered nothing more than a couple “of
anecdotal examples of remote wiping triggered by an arrest.”168
Regarding encryption, the Court noted that the police would have
limited opportunities to search a password-protected phone
162. See id. at 2483 (explaining that cell phones found on arrestees do not
pose a risk to officers and generally do not invoke exigency issues).
163. Id. at 2489.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 2492 (stating explicitly that Smith v. Maryland does not apply).
166. Id. at 2484.
167. See id. at 2485 (“Once an officer has secured a phone and eliminated any
potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can endanger no one.”).
168. See id. at 2486–87 (explaining that most phone screens would lock a few
minutes after an arrest).
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because smart phones “lock at the touch of a button or, as a default,
after some very short period of inactivity.”169 In any event, the
police can prevent remote wiping by disconnecting a phone from
the network, which can happen by removing the battery or placing
the phone in a bag that isolates it from receiving radio waves.170 If
there is evidence suggesting that a remote wipe is imminent, the
police may be able to establish “exigent circumstances” that would
justify an immediate warrantless search.171
Riley’s pro-privacy holding and statements offer U.S. citizens
some hope that the Court will eventually provide individuals with
protection against NSA surveillance of e-mail, text, and phone
communications.172 However, the decision does not inevitably lead
to that result.173 Even if the Court precludes the police from
reviewing the contents of an individual’s smart phone, it might not
go so far as to prohibit the NSA from accessing communications
sent by an individual through an ISP or cell phone provider that is
169. See id. at 2486
Moreover, in situations in which an arrest might trigger a remote-wipe
attempt or an officer discovers an unlocked phone, it is not clear that
the ability to conduct a warrantless search would make much of a
difference. The need to effect the arrest, secure the scene, and tend to
other pressing matters means that law enforcement officers may well
not be able to turn their attention to a cell phone right away. . . . Cell
phone data would be vulnerable to remote wiping from the time an
individual anticipates arrest to the time any eventual search of the
phone is completed, which might be at the station house hours later.
Likewise, an officer who seizes a phone in an unlocked state might not
be able to begin his search in the short time remaining before the phone
locks and data becomes encrypted.
(citations omitted).
170. See id. at 2487 (describing new technology to prevent encryption, such as
“Faraday bags”).
171. See id. at 2487–88 (outlining that a potential test regarding exigent
circumstances in situations with imminent threats of data wipes is the
reasonableness of the officer’s actions).
172. See Marc Rotenberg & Alan Butler, Symposium: In Riley v. California, a
Unanimous Supreme Court Sets Out Fourth Amendment for Digital Age,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
06/symposium-in-riley-v-california-a-unanimous-supreme-court-sets-out-fourthamendment-for-digital-age/ (last visited June 12, 2015) (“The Court’s opinion is
Riley v. California signals a Court more prepared to engage in the challenges of
the digital age ahead.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
173. See id. (explaining that the Court has not addressed this issue
specifically).
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remotely situated from the individual’s smart phone. As a result,
Riley does not definitively resolve the Fourth Amendment issues
raised by the NSA surveillance program and does not come to grips
with the Court’s prior precedent, which suggests that there is no
REOP in information that an individual voluntarily turns over to
a third party, and it is unclear whether and how the Court will
apply its precedent to smart phones and computers or to
communications made through such devices.174
Of course, even if the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence were construed broadly enough to allow an
individual to challenge the government’s seizure of phone call
information, texts, or emails, a potentially aggrieved individual
might not be able to bring suit.175 For one thing, the individual may
not be able to prove that he is under surveillance.176 As noted, when
the NSA sends a National Security Letter to a telecommunications
company, it usually includes an order precluding the company
from publicly acknowledging the letters or the disclosures or even
from alerting their customers.177 Moreover, to bring suit,
individuals must be able to establish standing in the sense of
establishing sufficient injury to satisfy the Article III case or
controversy
requirements.178
In
Clapper
v.
Amnesty
179
International, individuals who were the likely targets of NSA
surveillance (they were providing legal representation to alleged
terrorists who had been detained at Guantanamo Bay) sought to
challenge the cybersurveillance program.180 However, because of
174. See Jay Stanley, How the Supreme Court Could Have Ruled in Riley,
ACLU (Jun. 26, 2014, 11:17 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/how-supreme-courtcould-have-ruled-riley (last visited July 10, 2015) (explaining that the Court could
easily limit this decision in later cases) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
175. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10 ISJLP 551,
556 (2014) (describing one possible issue barring a Fourth Amendment claim:
standing).
176. See id. at 567 (explaining that proving data surveillance is difficult in the
absence of Snowden-like disclosures).
177. See generally Shane, supra note 1; Stanglin, supra note 1.
178. See generally Vladeck, supra note 175.
179. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
180. See id. at 1143 (highlighting the respondents’ argument that there was
an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications would be acquired
in the future).
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the secrecy that pervaded the NSA program, plaintiffs were unable
to prove that they were actual targets of the NSA program, and the
Court concluded that they could not establish injury or standing to
sue.181 Of course, the Court’s holding placed plaintiffs in an
impossible situation.182 To have standing to sue, plaintiffs must be
able to prove that the NSA is subjecting them to surveillance.183
However, the government goes to great lengths to maintain secrecy
and to preclude plaintiffs for knowing whether they are subject to
surveillance.184 In Clapper, the plaintiffs asked that the
Government be forced to reveal, through in camera proceedings,
whether it was intercepting respondents’ communications and
what targeting procedures it was using.185 The Court refused to
require the Government to make this revelation, noting that the
plaintiffs were required to establish standing by “pointing to
specific facts” and that the Government was not required to
“disprove standing by revealing details of its surveillance
priorities.”186 The net effect was that, because the government’s
surveillance program was super-secret, plaintiffs could not prove
that they were under surveillance, and therefore they could not

181. See id. at 1147 (“[I]njury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a
favorable ruling.’” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139,
149 (2010))).
182. See Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple
Error Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127, 130 (2014) (critiquing the Clapper
decision because the Court used it to shelter large swathes of governmental
conduct from the most effective forms of judicial review).
183. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013) (deciding that
the respondents lacked standing because they “cannot demonstrate that the
future injury they purportedly fear is certainly impending and because they
cannot manufacture standing by incurring costs in anticipation of non-imminent
harm”).
184. See Jackson, supra note 182, at 142 (arguing “[w]hen a government in a
democracy seeks to act in secret, the need for judicial review of the legality of
statutes authorizing the secrecy should be deemed specially pressing”).
185. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1149 n.4 (questioning the practical
implications of allowing a terrorist suspect to determine whether he or she was
under government surveillance by filing a law suit).
186. See id. (focusing on which party must prove standing in government
surveillance cases).
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meet the case or controversy necessary to proceed with the
litigation.187
Conclusion
Life, and rights, inevitably involve tradeoffs. Even skeptics of
governmental power recognize the need to balance governmental
interests and individual interests.188 Unquestionably, the
individual interest in privacy, which Justice Louis D. Brandeis
described as “the right most valued by civilized men,” and the
interest in preventing governmental overreach and abuse are
fundamental to life in a free society. However, they are not
regarded as absolute.189 Moreover, the government has a
compelling interest in gathering the information necessary to
prevent future terrorist attacks.190 The question is whether the
NSA surveillance program strikes the right balance between the
governmental interest in protecting society and the individual
interest in privacy.191
Nevertheless, when viewed from a historical perspective, the
NSA surveillance program can only be regarded as
extraordinary.192 Although the Framers of the U.S. Constitution
187. See Jackson, supra note 182, at 187 (concluding that the Clapper decision
protecting secret government spying programs through standing hurts alleged
victims, society, and even the Court).
188. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014) (analyzing the
interests of both the government and individuals).
189. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (defining the
most valued right as the right to be left alone by the government).
190. See Matthew Silverman, National Security and the First Amendment: A
Judicial Role in Maximizing Public Access to Information, 78 IND. L.J. 1101, 1111
(2003) (“Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of
information important to our national security and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence
service.” (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3. (1980))).
191. See id. at 1124 (“The challenge to the judicial branch is to adapt in a way
that preserves barriers to access where, in the interests of national security,
access should not be granted, while taking steps to prevent the abuse of privileges
where information should be released.”).
192. See Jenny Hendrix, NSA Surveillance Puts George Orwell’s ‘1984’ on
Bestseller Lists, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/
2013/jun/11/entertainment/la-et-jc-nsa-surveillance-puts-george-orwells-1984on-bestseller-lists-20130611 (last visited June 6, 2015) (quoting President
Obama’s defense of the N.S.A. surveillance program: “In the abstract, you can
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embraced a movement away from monarchy towards democracy,
they exhibited distrust towards government and feared potential
abuses of governmental power. This distrust is evident in the fact
that the Framers embraced Montesquieu’s notion of separation of
powers and created a system that involved checks and
balances.193 In addition, the founding generation was worried
that the doctrine of separation of powers did not provide sufficient
protection against governmental abuse and demanded what
became the Bill of Rights.194
While it is difficult to know for sure how other generations
would have reacted, one can relatively easily surmise that the
founding generation would have been dumbfounded to learn of
the NSA’s surveillance and data collection program.
Unquestionably, the technology that the NSA has employed to
implement its program is beyond anything that they could
possibly have been imagined at that time. Beyond that, the
founding generation was concerned about governmental abuses
of power, and such a broad-based surveillance program presents
a huge potential for abuse. Despite governmental claims that
such spying is needed to protect Americans against terrorists, the
founding generation might have feared that governmental
officials would use its data collection against Americans.
Of course, the fundamental problem with the NSA
surveillance relates to the secrecy with which it was conducted.
In a democratic society, in which the power to govern flows from
the consent of the governed, one can legitimately question
whether the government should be operating such a massive
surveillance program shrouded in secrecy. It is important that
the people be allowed to debate the competing values and to weigh
in on the size and scope of the program. Perhaps the American
public will decide that the global war against terrorism justifies
the potential risks presented by such a program. Perhaps not.

complain about Big Brother and how this is a potential program run amok, but
when you actually look at the details, then I think we've struck the right
balance.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
193. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (focusing on Montesquieu’s
separation of powers doctrine to reduce tyranny in the Federal Government).
194. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing the states’
condition of adoption of a bill of rights to ratify the Constitution).
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Regardless, society should be given a full and fair opportunity to
have this debate.

